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DRUG TESTING IN THE WORKPLACE:
A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
TO PROTECT PRIVACY
That the individual shall have full protection in person and property is a
principle as old as the common law; but it has been found necessary from
time to time to define anew the exact nature and extent of such protection.
INTRODUCTION
The practice of employee testing is not a new phenomenon. In the past,
employers used such testing in an attempt to ascertain an individual's intel-
ligence, attitude, or honesty.2 Today, the nature of employee testing has
changed. It is now often used to determine behavorial rather than psycho-
logical aberrations. These tests include medical screening3 for drug use. The
use of such testing in the workplace, mainly in the form of urinalysis, has
grown recently in response to increased drug use by employees at all levels.4
This practice has brought the rights and interests of the parties involved
into direct conflict. Employers view drug testing as enabling them to profit-
ably manage their companies. By using testing to identify drug users, they
claim that they are able to avoid the economic costs associated with drug
abuse and thus protect their property interests.5 Those subjected to such
testing, however, challenge the practice as an invasion of their right to pri-
vacy and criticize the accuracy as well as interpretation of test results.
This note contends that all employees and prospective employees should
be protected from the type of intrusion that results from drug testing. It first
discusses the current use of drug testing in the workplace and the conflict of
interests it engenders. It focuses primarily on the adverse effect of this prac-
tice upon both the employee's and prospective employee's right to privacy.
After examining the legal origin and treatment of this right in both the
1. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
2. The Ruckus Over Medical Testing, FORTUNE, Aug. 19, 1985, at 57. See Hurd, The Use of the
Polygraph in Screening Job Applicants, 22 AM. Bus. L.J. 529 (1985). Silas, Fit for the Job? Testing
Grows-Gripes Too, 70 A.B.A.J. 34 (1984); Gardner, Wiretapping the Mind: A Call to Regulate
Truth Verification in Employment, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295 (1984); Lester, Babcock, Cassissi &
Brunetta, Hiring Despite the Psychologist's Objections: An Evaluation of Police Officers, 7 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 41 (1980); Hermann, Privacy, the Prospective Employee, and Employment Testing:
The Need to Restrict Polygraph and Personality Testing, 47 WASH. L. REV. 73 (1971-72).
3. " 'Medical Screening' may be defined as the process by which a workforce is selected and main-
tained by application of medical criteria." M. ROTHSTEIN, MEDICAL SCREENING OF WORKERS 9
(1984).
4. See Battling the Enemy Within, TIME, March 17, 1986, at 57; Test Employees for Drug Use?, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., March 17, 1986, at 58; The Ruckus Over Medical Testing, FORTUNE, Aug.
19, 1985, at 57; Wall St. J., Aug. 8, 1985, at 6, col. 1; The Executive Addict, FORTUNE, June 24,
1985, at 24; N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, § 3, at 17, col. 2; Taking Drugs on the Job, NEWSWEEK,
'Aug. 22, 1983, at 52; Drug Abuse on the Job of Growing Concern, J. of Commerce, Aug. 10, 1983,
§ A, at 7, col. 3.
5. 'In the aggregate, the cost of drug abuse to American industry in terms of the lost productivity is
estimated to be over $25 billion. RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE, ECONOMIC COSTS TO SOCIETY
OF ALCOHOL, DRUG ABUSE AND MENTAL ILLNESS: 1980, at 3 (1984)
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private and public workplace, the note argues that the present legal re-
sponse is inadequate because it only protects the privacy rights of public
sector employees. It contends that this discrepancy cannot be justified and
concludes that a legislative response is needed. Finally, the note proposes
model provisions to guide legislators in their efforts to extend adequate pro-
tection to employees in the private workplace.
DRUG TESTING IN THE WORKPLACE
The use of illicit drugs has become "a commonplace part of American
life."' 6 The National Institute on Drug Abuse reports a steady increase in
the number of people using drugs over the last twenty years.7 Throughout
this period, marijuana and cocaine have remained the most commonly
abused controlled substances. A recent survey reports that an estimated
fifty-six million Americans have tried marijuana, twenty million of whom
are described as current users.8 The same survey revealed that an estimated
twenty-two million Americans have used cocaine, four million of whom are
described as current users.9 Consequently, the population segment that
makes up much of America's workforce includes a large number of drug
users.
The impact of this pattern of national drug use is felt throughout soci-
ety, and the workplace is not immune. 'I The use of illicit drugs on the job
has become "as common as the coffee break and is fast replacing alcoholism
as a major problem in the workplace."'" Public and private employers have
responded to this problem by implementing medical screening programs to
detect drug use.' 2 The largest public employer to implement such a pro-
gram is the United States military. 3 Although this program was previously
6. ADAMS, BLANKEN, FERGUSON, & REZNIKOV, OVERVIEW OF SELECTED DRUG TRENDS 1 (1985)
(available from the National Institute on Drug Abuse).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 11. Among young adults (aged 18-25) both lifetime prevalence of use and current use de-
creased between 1979 and 1982. Such use among adults (aged 26 and older), however, "increased
significantly" during the same period. NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, NATIONAL SUR-
VEY ON DRUG ABUSE: MAIN FINDINGS 1982, at 7 (Reprinted 1984) [hereinafter cited as DRUG
ABUSE SURVEY].
9. ADAMS, BLANKEN, FERGUSON & REZNIKOV, supra note 6, at 7. Between 1979 and 1982 cocaine
use by young adults increased slightly, while use among adults nearly doubled. See DRUG ABUSE
SURVEY, supra note 8, at 17-18.
10. Commentators suggest a direct correlation between the pattern of national drug use and the preva-
lence of drugs in the workplace. See Bensinger, Drugs in the Workplace, 60 HARV. Bus. REV. 48
(1982).
11. Drug Abuse on the Job of Growing Concern, supra note 4, at 7 (quoting the head of a corporate
consulting firm specializing in employee drug abuse). A significant number of workers are esti-
mated to use drugs, especially marijuana and cocaine, while on the job. The prevalence rate of
using marijuana daily (ever) by labor force participants has been estimated to be as follows: 18.9%
for males aged 18-19, 14.3% for females; 21.8% for males aged 20-24, 11% for females; and 12.5%
for males aged 25-34, 4.5% for females. RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE, supra note 5, at A-13.
Likewise, the Cocaine National Help Line recently revealed that 75% of those calling in 1985
admitted that they had sometimes used cocaine while on the job, and 69% said that they regularly
worked while under its influence. Battling the Enemy Within, supra note 4, at 53.
12. Despite the lack of specific statistical data, commentators agree that the use of medical screening
for drug use in the workplace increases daily. See, e.g., Bureau of Business Practices, DRUGS IN
THE WORKPLACE 2 (1983) (available from Bureau of Business Practices, Waterford, CT);
Schwartz & Hawks, Laboratory Detection of Marijuana Use, 254 J. A.M.A. 788 (1985).
13. The Navy, Army, Air Force, and Marines have conducted over six million drug tests in the past
two years. It is significant to note that this extensive testing program, characterized by sloppy
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restricted to military personnel, the Pentagon has announced plans to begin
testing civilian employees holding "critical jobs."14 Likewise, in 1985, the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration became the first non-military pub-
lic employer to announce plans to conduct urinalysis of all employees.' 5
Such practices are likely to increase in light of a recent federal study en-
couraging employee drug testing as a means of curtailing drug trafficking by
organized crime. 1 6
The increasing popularity of drug testing is not restricted to the public
sector.' 7 Private sector employers known to have implemented such pro-
grams include Alcoa, AT&T, DuPont, Exxon, Federal Express, Ford Mo-
tor Company, General Motors, Greyhound Lines, IBM, Lockheed, Mobile,
The New York Times, Northeast Utilities, Shearson Lehman, TWA, and
United Airlines.1 8 A recent survey of the Fortune 500 companies revealed
that eighteen percent presently use urinalysis testing as a means of combat-
ing employee drug use, and an additional twenty percent plan to institute
such programs in the next two years.' 9 These tests are primarily used to
testing and paperwork, resulted in tens of thousands of false positives which officials now admit
"wrecked" many military careers. United Press International, Aug. 26, 1984 (available on
NEXIS).
14. The Associated Press, May 30, 1985 (available on NEXIS).
15. Campbell, Random Drug Testing Spreads in America's Workplace, The Hartford Courant, Mar.
12, 1986, § A, at 24, col. 1.
16. A recent report compiled by the President's Commission on Organized Crime proposed the use of
widespread, random drug testing as a valuable weapon in its war against organized crime. The
commission identified drug trafficking as the most widespread and lucrative organized crime activ-
ity in the United States. It categorized drug supply and demand as mutually dependent and recom-
mended that both government and private sector employers initiate drug testing programs in an
effort to curtail demand. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, AMERICA'S HABIT:
DRUG ABUSE, DRUG TRAFFICKING AND ORGANIZED CRIME (1986). This recommendation was
heavily criticized on Capitol Hill. Representative Peter Rodino (D- N.J.), chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee and a member of the commission, stated: "While drug testing may be appro-
'priate in certain circumstances and in certain industries, wholesale testing is unwarranted and
raises serious civil liberty concerns." Chicago Tribune, Mar. 9, 1986, § 5, at l, col. 1. Representa-
tive Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) agreed: "Trying to stop organized crime's multimillion dollar drug
business by creating a police state in federal office buildings would be virtually ineffective and
would create one crime to stop another." Battling the Enemy Within, supra note 4, at 53. Also, in a
letter to President Reagan, Representative Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo.), who heads a House civil
service subcommittee, said: "The foolishness of the commission's approach is demonstrated by the
fact that no one is proposing testing for off-duty use of the two most addictive and destructive
drugs known to society-alcohol and tobacco." Chicago Tribune, Mar. 9, 1986, § 5, at 1, col. 1.
It is interesting to note that at a recent hearing concerning mandatory drug testing for all
federal workers, the deputy executive director of the President's commission, Rodney Smith, re-
fused to give a urine sample prior to testifying. He complained that he was not warned in advance
and called the request "a cheap stunt." Such criticism is ironic, since under the commission's
proposal federal workers would have no warning, and is indicative of the general public's response
to such a request. Chicago Tribune, Mar. 19, 1986, § 1, at 10, col. 1.
17. The controversial practice of drug testing has recently been introduced in professional sports. For
example, before the start of the 1986 season, the commissioner of professional baseball ordered
random, unannounced drug tests for all employees under his control. This program, which would
include minor league players and non-playing major league staff, was viewed as a thinly veiled
attempt to pressure the major league players' union to encourage voluntary testing programs or
include testing in player's contracts. Six months later, a survey of all 26 clubs indicated that little
-testing had actually been done. Nonetheless, an increasing number of clubs are attempting to in-
clude mandatory testing clauses in players' contracts. Bishop, Drug Testing Comes to Work, CALIF.
LAW., Apr. 1986, at 29, 31; Smith, Employee Drug Testing: Intrusive, Degrading, PRIVACY J., May
1985, at 1.
18. See Battling the Enemy Within, supra note 4, at 57; Smith, supra note 17, at 1.
19. NOEL DUNIVANT & ASSOCIATES, DRUG TESTING IN MAJOR U.S. CORPORATIONS: A SURVEY OF
THE FORTUNE 500 (1985) (available from Noel Dunivant & Associates, Raleigh, N.C.) [hereinaf-
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detect the use of marijuana, cocaine, barbituates, and amphetamines.2°
Although the companies surveyed indicated that their programs were initi-
ated in response to "incidences of drug use in the workplace and a concern
for employee safety,"'" those who advise them admit that they are largely
motivated by financial considerations.22
Employers use drug testing to screen employees as well as job applicants
for drug use. When used to screen employees, it is often administered ran-
domly or restricted to situations where the employee's conduct indicates the
possibility of drug use.2 3 When drug testing is used as part of a pre-employ-
ment screening program, it normally serves a preventative function. It is
implemented to protect employers from future problems by weeding out
prospective employees who use drugs.24 As a result, employers are unlikely
to hire an applicant who tests positive. In contrast, when an employee is
tested positive for drug use, the tests may result in firing, punishment, sur-
veillance, and/or rehabilitative treatment. 25 In both situations, however, the
employer's decision is likely to depend on such variables as the nature of the
job, the extent of the financial investment involved in hiring and training,
the source of funding for treatment, and the existence of any applicable
state disability laws.2 6
ter cited as FORTUNE 500 SURVEY]. Although this report indicates that "most" of the companies
surveyed "thought employee drug use constituted a problem," it is interesting to note the break-
down: only 5% thought it was a "significant" problem, 23% a "moderate" problem, 39% a
"slight" problem, and 28% "no problem." Id. at 4.
Two other surveys also indicate the existence of drug testing in the private sector. A recent
survey by the Bureau of Business Practices of a cross-section of the Fortune 500 companies re-
vealed that 26% of the companies contacted had an urinalysis screening program in place and
11% said they were looking into starting one. Chicago Tribune, Dec. 1, 1985, § 7, at 22. Also, in a
1985 survey of its membership, the American Society for Personnel Administration reported that
44% of the 390 companies contacted had considered increasing the amount of testing done in the
workplace. Twenty-six percent of these companies indicated they would add tests for drug and
alcohol use. Presently, 17% of the companies screen applicants for drug use and 12% screen em-
ployees. American Society for Personnel Administration, Resource Survey No. 12 (1985) (avail-
able from ASPA, Alexandria, Va.).
20. FORTUNE 500 SURVEY, supra note 19, at 5.
21. Id. at 7.
22. In a recent interview, the president of a consulting firm that advises companies on establishing
drug testing programs and a former administrator of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
admitted that from an employer's perspective drug testing is really "a bottom-line issue." Camp-
bell, supra note 15, at 24.
23. Of the Fortune 500 companies surveyed, 80% indicated that they had programs which screened
job applicants, 47% indicated that they tested employees following involvement in accidents, and
13% indicated that they subjected employees to random tests to discover drug use. FORTUNE 500
SURVEY, supra note 19, at 3-5. Of all these programs, the practice of random testing is the most
controversial because it presumes that all the test subjects are guilty and may result in needlessly
invading the privacy rights of innocent employees. This form of testing is increasing despite the
advice of experts:
For the large portion of the American workforce, where there is not an obvious safety risk
or danger to other employees, random screening is probably not necessary .. . . [W]e try
to convince people . . . that they can deal effectively with the problem without going to a
random testing program.
Campbell, supra note 15, at 24 (quoting J. Michael Walsh, Chief of Clinical and Behavioral Phar-
macology for the National Institute on Drug Abuse).
24. See L. DOGOLOFF & R. ANGAROLA, URINE TESTING IN THE WORKPLACE 11 (1985).
25. Morgan, Problems of Mass Urine Screening for Misused Drugs, 16 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 305,
306 (1984).
26. Federal and state disability laws define "handicapped" as including individuals suffering from alco-
hol or drug addiction. These laws offer such employees additional protection in the workplace. See
infra note 70.
Employee Drug Testing
DRUG TESTING: METHODS AND PROBLEMS
The most commonly used screening methods to determine employee
drug use are enzyme immunoassay and radioimmunoassay.27 These tech-
niques are used to analyze urine samples for the presence of marijuana,
cocaine, barbituates, amphetamine, phencyclidine (PCP), opiates (including
heroin), benzodiazepine, and methaqualone.28 While enzyme immunosassay
may be used in the laboratory or at the workplace,29 the radioimmunoassay
is restricted to a laboratory setting because it uses radioactive materials.3"
Regardless of where the tests are performed, manufacturers recommend
that all positive test results be confirmed by an alternative method in order
to hedge against inaccurate results.3 ' Preferably this method should be
more sophisticated and at least as sensitive as the original screening test.32
Gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC/MS) is the most widely
used method of confirming positive immunoassay test results.33 Although
GC/MS is the most accurate drug testing method available it is not used as
an initial screening device because it is very costly and must be performed
in a laboratory by highly trained technicians.34 It costs an employer under
five dollars to screen a urine sample with an immunoassay test3 5 and be-
tween $50-100 to have it confirmed with GC/MS.3 6 Because of the addi-
tional expense involved, employers do not always conduct confirmations to
verify the "presumed positive test results" of immunoassay methods.37 This
reliance on initial screening techniques is criticized because these techniques
can produce incorrect results. These false results fall into two categories:
false-positives, which indicate that a person has taken a drug when he has
not, and false-negatives, which indicate that a person has not taken a drug
when he actually has. In the employment context, the possibility of false-
positives are of primary concern because such test results are likely to pre-
27. L. DOGOLOFF & R. ANGAROLA, supra note 24, at 20. Both of these immunoassay techniques
"utilize complex immunochemistry and the production of drug antibodies in interaction with en-
zymic detectors to reflect the presence of drugs." Morgan, supra note 25, at 308. In the enzyme
immunoassay method the reaction causes a color change which can be measured by a device called
a spectrophotometer. In the radioimmunoassay method, a low level of radiation is given off which
is measured by a gamma counter. L. DOGOLOFF & R. ANGAROLA, supra note 24, at 21.
28. See L. DOGOLOFF & R. ANGAROLA, supra note 24, at 21.
29. A major manufacturer of the immunoassay technique markets it as a viable on site method because
"it does not require specific licensed personnel, subjective interpretation of results, or special han-
dling techniques and safety precautions." Morgan, supra note 25, at 306.
30. L. DOGOLOFF & R. ANGAROLA, supra note 24, at 21.
31. Id. at 21-22.
32. Id. at 22; Centers for Disease Control, Urine Testing for Detection ofMarijuana Use: An Advisory,
32 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 469, 470 (1983) [hereinafter cited as CDC
Advisory].
33. See Schwartz & Hawks, Laboratory Detection for Marijuana Use, 254 J. A.M.A. 788, 790 (Aug.
1985).
34. See id.; L. DOGOLOFF & R. ANGAROLA, supra note 24, at 22.
35. The Ruckus Over Medical Testing, supra note 2, at 60 (quoting Dr. Joe Boone, chief of the Centers
for Disease Control's clinical chemistry and toxicology section); Lewey, Preemployment Qualita-
tive Urine Toxicology Screening, 25 J. Occup. MED. 57, 58 (1983). A survey of Fortune 500 com-
panies reported an average fee for screenings of $18.19. FORTUNE 500 SURVEY, supra note 19, at 9.
36. Campbell, supra note 15 (quoting Dr. David J. Greenblatt, chief of clinical pharmacology at Tufts-
New England Medical Center). A survey of Fortune 500 companies reported an average bulk-fee
of $20.45 and the average single fee to be $34.49. FORTUNE 500 SURVEY, supra note 19, at 9.
37. CDC Advisory, supra note 32, at 470; The Ruckus Over Medical Testing, supra note 2, at 6.
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cipitate in an unjustified action against a job applicant or employee. 38 Con-
sequently, considerations of prudence and fairness should be paramount in
determining acceptable levels of accuracy.3 9
False-positive immunoassay test results are usually attributable to oper-
ator error, poor procedures of laboratory quality control, and positive reac-
tions due to the presence of other chemicals such as caffeine and over-the-
counter cough and cold medications.' Although these factors are recog-
nized and to a large degree correctable,4' field tests conducted by the Cen-
ters for Disease Control reveal that they may be difficult to overcome. One
field test monitored the drug screening programs of thirteen independent
laboratories and found that some laboratories had a false-positive error rate
of up to sixty percent.42 It concluded that these laboratories suffered from
"serious shortcomings" in quality control even though they knew they were
being monitored.43
Even if laboratories are able to overcome the problems associated with
false-positives, the application of drug testing to employee screening is still
subject to criticism. A positive urine test only provides evidence that the
individual ingested the detected drug." It does not prove intoxication or
impaired job performance at the time the specimen was taken.45 Pharmacol-
ogists and chemists agree that evidence of drug use may appear in urine for
several days or even weeks after ingestion.46 For instance, a urine test for
38. Although a false-negative test result does not adversely affect the job applicant or employee, its
occurrence demonstrates a functional weakness of the test, i.e. its inability to detect drug use. The
Centers for Disease Control monitored the testing programs of 13 laboratories that screen com-
monly abused drugs. It revealed the following ranges of error rates: 0% to 100% for cocaine, 11%
to 94% for barbituates, and 19% to 100% for amphetamines. Hansen, Caudill & Boone, Crisis in
Drug Testing, 253 J. A.M.A. 2382 (1985).
39. Even if the test used is highly accurate, the act of randomly screening a large group of individuals
in order to discover a few guilty parties raises serious concerns. For instance, suppose a drug test
with a 95% accuracy rate (i.e., one in every 20 tests results in a false-positive) is used to screen a
large group of employees. Assuming less than one percent of these employees has actually used
drugs, this "accurate" test will falsely accuse five employees for every true accusation. Wall St. J.,
Apr. 1, 1986, at 22, col. 3.
40. See Morgan, supra note 25, at 309-12; L. DOGOLOFF & R. ANGAROLA, supra note 24, at 22. The
accuracy of drug testing is also criticized because positive test results may be caused by uninten-
tional exposure to illicit drugs. For instance, a positive test result for marijuana use may result
from the passive inhalation of marijuana smoke at a party or rock concert. Also, positive tests for
cocaine can result from drinking certain herbal teas which contain small quantities of the drug. 4
EMPLOYEE REL. WEEKLY (BNA) 388 (Mar. 31, 1986).
41. See Morgan, supra note 25, at 309-12; L. DOGOLOFF & R. ANGAROLA, supra note 24, at 23;
Schwartz & Hawks, supra note 33, at 790.
42. The report revealed the following false-positive error rates: barbituates, 0% to 6%; amphetamines,
0% to 37%; methadone, 0% to 66%; cocaine, 0% to 6%; codeine, 0% to 7%; and morphine, 0%
to 10%. Hansen, Caudill & Boone, supra note 38, at 2382. Another field test monitored 64 com-
mercial laboratories that used the most widely marketed immunoassy technique for screening ma-
rijuana. It reported "an incidence of 4% false-positive results," however, it did not determine the
origin of the errors. CDC Advisory, supra note 32, at 469.
43. Hansen, Caudill, & Boone, supra note 38, at 2382-88.
44. See CDC Advisory, supra note 32, at 469-70; L. DOGOLOFF & R. ANGAROLA, supra note 24, at 22;
Schwartz & Hawks, supra note 33, at 790-91.
45. The effects of drug use have not been correlated with specific concentrations of drug metabolites in
urine specimens. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, Q & A, DETECTION OF DRUG USE
BY URINALYSIS 13 (1986); McBay, Cannabinoid Testing. Forensic and Analytical Aspects, 23 LAB-
ORATORY MANAGEMENT 36, 63 (1985).
46. Many factors, other than the tests sensitivity, influence the amount of time drugs can be detected in
urine samples. These include the type of drug used, the amount and purity of the drug, how often it
is used, and the user's age, weight, and metabolism. See CDC Advisory, supra note 32, at 469-70; L.
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marijuana can detect prior use for up to two weeks in the casual user and
even longer in the chronic user.47 Consequently, an individual may test pos-
itive for drug use without being impaired.
A CONFLICT OF INTERESTS
Employers perceive drug use by employees to be a serious problem. The
typical drug user in today's workforce is estimated to be late three times as
often as other employees, and is absent and requests time off twice as
often.4" In addition, he or she is estimated to request three times the normal
level of sick benefits49 and is far more likely to be involved in an accident or
file a workmen's compensation claim.5" Employers contend that such ad-
verse consequences justify the use of drug testing as a preventative measure.
Since employing a drug user may result in an economic loss, they claim that
they have a right to know-i.e., to discover via testing-who is using drugs
in the workplace. This knowledge is viewed as essential to the protection of
their property interests. Employers also argue that drug testing enables
them to protect the health and safety of all employees by the early detection
of drug abuse problems and the prevention of drug related accidents.5" Fi-
nally, they claim that it allows them to meet their civic duty by upholding
community standards.52
Employers are not deterred by the fact that drug testing may result in
unfairly depriving a number of qualified individuals of employment. They
are more concerned with weeding out the "bad" employee than accurately
identifying the good employee. Employers favor testing because it will al-
DOGOLOFF & R. ANGAROLA, supra note 24, at 22; Schwartz & Hawks, supra note 33, at 790-91.
The following are ranges of time that various drugs can be detected after ingestion: cocaine, 24 to
48 hours; amphetamines, 48 to 72 hours; barbituates, 3 days to 3 weeks depending on the chemi-
cals involved. Campbell, supra note 15, at 24 (information compiled from chemists at the National
Institute on Drug Abuse, the Centers for Disease Control, and Tufts-New England Medical
Center).
47. See CDC Advisory, supra note 32, at 469-70; L. DOGOLOFF & R. ANGAROLA, supra note 24, at 22;
Schwartz & Hawks, supra note 33, at 790-91.
48. The typical drug user is estimated to be "late three times more often than fellow employees, re-
quests early dismissal or time off during work 2.2 times more often, and has 2.5 times as many
absences of eight days or more." Taking Drugs on the Job, supra note 4, at 57 (quoting a Miami-
based drug consulting firm).
49. Id.
50. The typical drug user is estimated to be "five times more likely to file a workman's compensation
claim, and is involved in accidents 3.6 times more often than other employees." Id.
51. The employer's legal responsibility for the protection of the employee originated at common law.
Common law imposed the following duties upon the employer: The duty to (1) provide a safe place
to work; (2) provide safe appliances, tools, and equipment for the work; (3) give warnings of dan-
gers of which the employee might reasonably be expected to remain in ignorance; (4) provide a
sufficient number of suitable fellow employees; and (5) promulgate and enforce rules for the con-
duct of employees that would make the work safe. This imposition of liability upon the employer
has been largely preempted by the passage of workmen's compensation acts. These statutes estab-
lish a system of compulsory liability insurance which is based on social policy rather that tort. W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 568-77 (5th ed. 1984).
52. This is the weakest of the employer's arguments in support of drug testing. The police, not the
employer, act as the legitimate law enforcement mechanism of society. When the employer discov-
ers an illegal activity in the workplace, his "civic duty" is limited to notifying the police and
cooperating with them as requested. Although it is illegal to possess or sell a controlled substance,
it is not illegal to be under the influence of such a substance. As a result, the employer cannot
justify employee drug testing as an extension of any "civic duty."
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most certainly ensure a drug free workforce.13 They defend its application
to employee screening by claiming that the doctrine of employment at will
gives them the authority to impose any conditions or restrictions upon the
employment relationship so long as they do not violate an employment con-
tract or statute specifically restricting this prerogative.5 4
Employers' use of drug testing as a means of protecting their interests
and fulfilling their responsibilities comes into direct conflict with the inter-
ests of those they subject to the tests. This conflict extends beyond the previ-
ously discussed issues of accuracy and application of test results." Both job
applicants and employees view drug testing as repugnant to one's most ba-
sic concept of personal liberty. They argue that the process inverts the
traditional presumption of innocence by, in effect, requiring them to prove
that they are not guilty of using illegal drugs. Their most fervent objection,
however, stems from their perception of the nature of the test itself. Both
job applicants and employees view urinalysis as an intolerable intrusion
which violates their right to privacy.
EMPLOYEE TESTING: AN INVASION OF PRIVACY?
A personal notion of a right to privacy pervades our society.56 Most
individuals believe that they are entitled to a certain degree of privacy in
their daily affairs and that they should be able to decide for themselves the
time and condition under which these aspects of their lives are made public.
Unwarranted intrusions upon this right to be left alone are resented and
seen as threatening the individual's sense of personal freedom and dignity.5
53. Reliance on drug testing alone is apt to lull the employer into a false sense of security. Any assur-
ance provided by drug testing is at best temporary. Test results have not been shown to have any
predictive value.
54. The employment at will doctrine dates back to the mid-19th century when courts began to view the
employment relationship as one of contract rather than status. See Martin v. New York Life Insur-
ance Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895) (the leading case giving birth to the "American rule").
"The relentless logic of the contract approach dictated the rule that the employee had only such
rights as were expressly agreed to in his contract of employment-no more and no less." L. LAR-
SON & P. BOROWSKY, UNJUST DISSMISSAL § 1.01 (1985). In 1908, the Supreme Court described
this relationship: "The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in
its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which
he will accept such labor from the person offering to sell it." Adair v. U.S., 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
In recent years the employment at will doctrine has been subject to a growing number of excep-
tions, both judicial and legislative. L. LARSON & P. BOROWSKY, UNJUST DISMISSAL § 1.01.
Although many states still recognize this doctrine, "the trend to specific exceptions to the at-will
rule will probably continue unabated, as courts and legislatures respond to perceived employer
abuses." Id. at § 2-19. See id. at § 10.01-10.53 for a state-by-state analysis of current statutes and
cases.
55. Job applicants and employees are justifiably disatisfied with the reported accuracy of drug testing
results. They want the tests to be accurate every time in order to prevent unjust denial of employ-
ment. Test subjects also attack the inability of the tests to ascertain drug induced impairment.
Consequently, they charge that test results are "being disastrously misinterpreted" and that they
should provide the impetus for asking questions rather than the evidence on which to deprive
someone of employment. Campbell, supra note 15, at 24.
56. The right to privacy has its foundations in the instincts of nature. It is recognized intuitively,
consciousness being the witness to prove its existence. Any person of normal intellect recog-
nizes at once that as to each individual member of society there are matters private and
public. Each individual instinctively resents any encroachment upon this right.
Bednarik v. Bednarik, 16 A.2d. 80, 90 (N.J. Ch. 1940).
57. The leading case recognizing the existence of the right to privacy identified personal freedom ("lib-
erty") as an essential element of the concept of privacy. Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance
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In order to determine whether or not drug testing constitutes such an en-
croachment, its nature as well as the circumstances surrounding its admin-
istration must be examined.
Although testing for drug use is a relatively recent phenomenon, other
forms of employment testing have raised similiar questions of propriety-
most notably polygraph testing." This form of testing is subject to the same
criticism as drug testing: there is serious doubt as to its accuracy and it is
generally viewed as an invasion of the test subject's privacy.5 9 Nonetheless,
polygraph testing is prevalent in the employment context 6° where, like drug
testing, employers use it to detect undesirable behavior. 61 Despite repeated
congressional efforts to ban the use of polygraphs in the private workplace,
no federal legislation currently exists in this area.62 Over one-half of the
Co., 122 Ga. 190, 195-96, 50 S.E. 68, 70 (1905). Since that time, the elements of personal freedom
and dignity have been incorporated in many definitions of the right to privacy. See, e.g., OFFICE OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRIVACY AND BEHAVIORAL RE-
SEARCH 2 (1967) ("[t]he right to privacy is the right of the individual to decide for himself how
much he will share with others his thoughts, his feelings, and the facts of his personal life. It is a
right that is essential to insure dignity and freedom of self-determination"). See also Gavison,
Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE L. J. 421, 428-29, 438 (1980); D. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY,
LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1979); J. SHATTUCK, RIGHTS OF PRIVACY (1977); A. MILLER, THE
ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 25 (1971); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); Westin, Science,
Privacy and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970's, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1022-31
(1966); Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Diginity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 962, 971, 973 (1964).
58. The polygraph, or lie detector, measures the test subject's physiological responses to verbal ques-
tions. The test usually measures three different types of physiological responses: the rate and depth
of respiration, blood pressure, and perspiration rate. It operates on the theory that the test subject's
fear of detection, when responding deceptively, produces a measurable physiological reaction. OF-
FICE OF TECHNOLOGY AND ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF POLYGRAPH
TESTING 6, 11 (1983).
59. While an in-depth examination of polygraph testing is beyond the scope of this note, there is an
extensive body of literature devoted specifically to this form of testing and its legal implications.
See generally Hurd, supra note 2; Kleinmuntz, Lie Detectors Fail to Tell Truth, 3 HARV. Bus.
REV. 36 (1985); Craig, The Presidential Polygraph Order and the Fourth Amendment: Subjecting
Federal Employees to Warrantless Searches, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 896 (1984); Gardner, supra note
2; Nemeth, Polygraph: Erosion of Privacy, 21 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 103 (1983); Nagle, Polygraph in
the Workplace, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 43 (1983); Lowe, Regulation of Polygraph Testing in the
Employment Context. Suggested Statutory Control on Test Use and Examiner Competence, 15
U.C.D. L. REV. 113 (1981); Falik, The Lie Detector and the Right to Privacy, 40 N.Y. ST. B.J. 102
(1968).
60. In 1982, more than one million job applicants and employees were subjected to polygraph exami-
nations as a condition of employment. This marks a threefold increase since 1974 when approxi-
mately 300,000 tests were given. MACNEIL-LEHRER REPORT, CORPORATE LIE DETECTORS, Apr.
6, 1983, at 1.
61. Polygraph testing is primarily used to detect employee theft which is estimated to cost employers
between $5 and $10 billion annually. Id.
62. A proposal to ban the use of polygraph testing in the private workplace is presently before both the
House (H.R. 1524, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.) and the Senate (S. 1815, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.). The
Senate bill was introduced a week after the House version and closely resembles it. Proponents of
this legislation are motivated by a concern over the accuracy of the tests and a desire to protect
employees from an unreasonable invasion of privacy. H. REP. No. 146, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-9
(1985). Congress has unsuccessfully sought to address this issue on 35 separate occasions in the
past two decades: H.R. 5866, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 4681, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 4186,
98th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 3687, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 2403, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R.
7416, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 3285, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 3194, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.;
H.R. 3108, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 381, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 7361, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.;
H.R. 7335, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 6697, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 6696, 96th Cong., 2d
Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 6592, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 6591, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 6579, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 6575, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 6034, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., S. 854, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 3255, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 2349, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 9335,
95th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 1845, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 4624, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 424
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state legislatures, however, have enacted statutes limiting or prohibiting the
use of polygraph testing by private and public employers. 63 Such wide-
spread recognition of the need to regulate this type of testing indicates the
value placed upon the rights of employees and the need to protect them. In
addition, it provides a valuable source of insight into the legal implications
of drug testing.
Employee drug testing, in the form of urinalysis, implicates the same
privacy concerns raised by polygraph testing. The nature of polygraph test-
ing is deemed intrusive because it is designed to override the will of the
individual by analyzing involuntary physiological responses.' This same
criticism applies to urinalysis because it also "interferes with a person's
sense of personal autonomy and reserve" by penetrating the "inner do-
main' '65 and analyzing uncontrolled physiological responses.66 In both
processes, an intrusion results from the worker's inability to determine
"when and under what conditions his thoughts, speech, and acts should be
revealed to others.",
67
This intrusion is magnified by the test subject's lack of control over both
the nature and amount of information extracted. In a polygraph examina-
95th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 13191, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 9002, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.; S.1841,
94th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 5438, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 5437, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R.
2596, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 564, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 17660, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.; S.
2836, 93d Cong., 1st Sess..
63. Nineteen states and the District of Columbia restrict the use of polygraph testing by employers.
ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.037 (1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51 (1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§ 704 (1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 378-21, -22 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 44-903, -904 (1977);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 7166 (Supp. 1980); MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95 (1979); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 19B (West Supp. 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.203 (Supp. 1983);
MINN. STAT. § 181.75 (1976); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1932
(1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:40A-1 (West 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.225 (1979); 18 PA.
CONST. STAT. ANN. § 7321 (Purdon 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-6.1-1,.1-2 (1979); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 49.44.120-.130 (Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE § 21-5-5b (1983); Wis. STAT. § 111.37 (1980
& Supp. 1982); D. C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-801 to -803 (1980).
Twenty-seven states regulate the use of polygraphs by requiring all examiners to be licensed.
ALA. CODE §§ 34-25-1 to 34-25-36 (1975 & Supp. 1981); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32.2701-
.2715 (1976 & Supp. 1981); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-2201 to -2225 (1979); CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE §§ 9300-9321 (Deering 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 493.561-.579 (West 1981); GA. CODE
§§ 84-5001 to -5016 (1975); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, §§ 2401-2432 (1978 & Cum. 1981); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 25-30-2-1 to -5 (Bums 1981); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 329.010-.990 (1977 & Supp.
1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:2831-:2854 (West 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32,
§§ 7151-7169 (Supp. 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 338.1701-.1729 (1970 & Supp. 1981); MISS.
CODE ANN. §§ 73-29-1 to -47 (1973); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 37-62-101 to 37-62-311 (1983); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 81-1901 to -1936 (1980 & Supp. 1983); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 648.005-.210 (1979);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-26-1 to -13 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 746-1 to -20 (1979); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 43-31-01 to -17 (1978 & Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, §§ 1451-1476 (West Supp.
1980); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-53-10 to 40-53-250 (Law. Co-op, 1976 & Supp. 1980); TENN CODE
ANN. §§ 62-27-101 to -124 (1978 & Supp. 1982); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 4413 (Vernon 1969 &
Supp. 1973, 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34.37-1 to -14 (1974 & Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
26, §§ 2901-2910 (Supp. 1981); VA. CODE §§ 54-916 to -922 (1978); W. VA. CODE §§ 21-5-5c, -5d
(1983).
64. Hermann, supra note 2, at 128.
65. This argument has been used to describe why the use of the polygraph constitutes an invasion of
privacy. See A. WESTIN, supra note 57, at 40.
66. See supra note 58.
67. The right to privacy has been defined as "the right of the individual to decide for himself, with only
extraordinary exceptions in the interest of the whole society, when and under what conditions his
thoughts, speech, and acts should be revealed to others." Hearings on the Use of Polygraphs as "Lie
Detectors" by the Fed. Gov't Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess., and 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1964-1965).
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tion, the subject is asked a series of questions in an attempt to ferret out his
attitudes and beliefs on a variety of issues.68 Once the test has begun, he
cannot refuse to answer a question, even if it is unrelated to the purpose for
which he is being tested, because his silence elicits a physiological response
that will be recorded and interpreted. 69 Likewise, when an individual sub-
jected to drug testing relinquishes a urine sample he relinquishes total con-
trol over the disclosure of information contained therein. A urine sample
contains a wealth of personal information. In addition to detecting drugs
ingested, it reveals the individual's medical history of such afflictions as ve-
nereal disease, epilepsy, and schizophrenia, as well as his susceptibility to
diseases such as heart attacks and sickle cell anemia.7°
The individual has a strong privacy interest in this personal informa-
tion. As a result, the means by which employers obtain it, as well as how
they utilize it, is a matter of concern. Individuals view urination as a private
act. They consider supervision of this act an affront to personal dignity.
This personal notion of privacy was recently recognized in an action chal-
lenging a prison's employee drug testing program. A federal district court
found that a person has a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy
in the discharge and disposal of urine. 7 ' The court stated that "one does not
reasonably expect to discharge urine under circumstances making it avail-
able to others to collect and analyze in order to discover the personal physi-
ological secrets it holds, except as part of a medical examination.
72
Consequently, the collection of urine in the workplace for purposes of drug
testing, especially under direct supervision,73 violates this expectation.
The employer's use of this information raises further privacy concerns.
Because the tests can yield positive results days and even weeks after drug
use, they in effect allow the employer to control the employee's off-duty
behavior. It is questionable whether an employer's influence should extend
beyond the workplace and dictate the employee's lifestyle. If the employer
can fire a person for smoking marijuana on Saturday night, what prevents
him from regulating such things as off-duty alcohol consumption or even
sleeping habits in an effort to ensure that the employee works to his full
capacity?
68. Hermann, supra note 2 at 154.
69. Hearings on Polygraph Control and Civil Liberties Protection Act Before the Subcomm. on the Judi-
ciary, 95th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess. 31, 249, 263 (1977-78).
70. The Ruckus Over Medical Testing, supra note 2, at 58. Federal and state laws prohibiting employ-
ment discrimination against "handicapped" individuals provide further support for regulating this
type of information. The Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 defines handicapped as including
individuals suffering from alcohol or drug addiction. The law protects these individuals unless their
addiction prevents them from performing their job or they pose a threat to the safety of others. 29
U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1982). See Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (D.C. Pa. 1978) (persons with
histories of drug use are handicapped individuals); E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088
(D.C. Hawaii 1980) (protection of handicapped individuals capable of performing jobs). Forty-
eight states have similar statutes prohibiting such practices. Drugs at Work, A.B.A.J., March 1,
1986, at 35.
71. McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
72. Id.
73. Manufacturers of immunoassay screening techniques suggest that urine samples be collected under
direct supervision. This is to prevent the test subject from inducing a false-negative test result by
adding an adulterant to his urine prior to collection. Schwartz & Hawks, supra note 33, at 790.
The number of employers following this recommendation is not known.
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Although urinalysis is inherently intrusive, an employee cannot estab-
lish an invasion of privacy if he has voluntarily consented to the test.74
Under the employment at will doctrine, the employer contends that em-
ployees consent to any testing that may be required by accepting employ-
ment with the company.75 Furthermore, employers argue that the
employees' express consent to specific requests, as well as the signing of
consent forms in advance, indicates a lack of coercion. Although it is true
that "no one is sticking a catheter up their bladder,"76 to categorically char-
acterize such consent as voluntary ignores the reality of the situation. The
nature of the employer-employee relationship coupled with the economic
consequences of unemployment substantially diminish the voluntary ele-
ment which is crucial to the concept of consent. "When the decision is be-
tween testing and employment, consent is far from free and voluntary.
77
As a result, the test subject's personal notion of privacy is violated. The lack
of true consent, coupled with the intrusive nature of the process and its
questionable reliability, threatens the individual's sense of personal freedom
and dignity and encroaches upon his right to be left alone.
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: SOURCES OF LEGAL RECOGNITION
AND PROTECTION
The individual's right to privacy has traditionally been recognized and
protected by tort and constitutional law. The former applies to invasions
resulting from the interaction of private individuals, 78 while the latter pro-
tects private individuals from invasions by the government and its agen-
74. Both tort and constitutional law recognize consent to the alleged offensive act as a legitimate de-
fense. Tort cases reveal that consent, whether express or implied, to particular conduct will prevent
that conduct from constituting an actionable invasion. See Hudson v. Craft, 33 Cal. 2d 654, 204
P.2d 1 (1948); Hart v. Geysel, 159 Wash. 632, 294 P. 570 (1930); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261,
104 N.W. 12 (1905); O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 154 Mass. 272, 28 N.E. 266 (1891); DeMay v.
Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881). In constitutional challenges, courts have held that a
search pursuant to voluntary consent, express or implied, does not violate the fourth amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973).
75. Cf Hermann, supra note 2, at 88.
76. Ruckus Over Medical Testing, supra note 2, at 58 (quoting Peter B. Bensinger, president of a
consulting firm that advises companies in establishing drug testing programs, formerly an adminis-
trator of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration).
77. A. WESTIN, supra note 57, at 240. See Falick, supra note 59, at 109; State v. Community Distribu-
tors, Inc., 64 N.J. 479, 317 A.2d 697 (1974) (court found that, due to the employment relationship,
an employee had "no realistic choice" when requested to submit to a polygraph test).
Granted, consent is a valid argument on the limited occasions where the employer and em-
ployee possess equal bargaining power. The process of collective bargaining in the unionized work-
place is an example of such an occasion. Nineteen percent of all employed wage and salary
workers are unionized. Adams, Changing Employment Patterns of Organized Workers, 108
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 25, 26 (1985). In situations where a collective bargaining agreement is in
force, drug testing is recognized as a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. See Local 1900,
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Potomac Electronic Power Company, No. 86-
717, (D.C. Cir. March 18, 1986) (available on LEXIS and WESTLAW). As a result, the employer
must bargain in good faith with the union prior to implementing a drug testing program. This
requirment provides union members with the leverage needed to secure protection from the pri-
vacy threat posed by drug testing. They may, however, in the true meaning of the word voluntary,
consent to such testing in exchange for some concession.
78. Tort law protects the individual from "private or civil wrongs or injury, other than breach of
contract" by enforcing "legal duties which are owed to persons generally or to classes of persons."
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 51, at 1-6; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1335 (5th ed.
1979).
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cies. 79 Although the source and scope of this protection differ, the nature of
the privacy interest involved is the same.
Tort Law and the Private Sector
In a 1890 law review article, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis intro-
duced the concept of a right to privacy within tort. ° By tracing common
law development, they identified the right to privacy as an independent,
actionable interest. They concluded that "the common law secures to each
individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts,
sentiments, and emotions should be communicated to others""1 and sum-
marized this as "the general right to be left alone." 2
Today, courts have generally recognized four different forms of invasion
of this right as being actionable:83 (1) misappropriation of another's name
or likeness;84 (2) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another;85
(3) unreasonable disclosure (publicity) of another's private affairs;86 and
(4) publicity that unreasonably places another in a false light before the
79. The Constitution limits the actions of the government, not those of private parties. In 1875, seven
years after the passage of the fourteenth amendment prohibiting states from denying individual
rights, the Supreme Court stated: "The fourteenth amendment prohibits a state from depriving any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of
one citizen as against another." U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 542-43 (1875). Eight years later,
the Court said: "It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of
individual rights is not the subject matter of the amendment. . . . The wrongful act of an individ-
ual is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11
(1883). This doctrine of "state action" prevents the government, including its agencies and repre-
sentatives, from violating the constitutional rights of private individuals. See Ayoub, The State
Action Doctrine in State and Federal Courts, 11 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 893 (1984); Phillips, The
Inevitable Incoherence of Modern State Action Doctrine, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 683 (1984).
80. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 193.
81. Id. at 198.
82. Id. at 193, 195, 205.
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note
51, at 851. "The law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasions of four distinct interests
of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in
common except that each represents an interference with the right of the plaintiff. . 'to be let
alone.'" Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 392 (1960).
84. This was the first type of invasion of privacy to be recognized by the courts. See Flake v. Greens-
boro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938) (publication of plaintiff's photo in a newspaper
advertisement without plaintiff's consent).
85. See Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969) (appellants
received copies of documents removed from appellee's office without authorization). In defining
the tort of intrusion upon another's seclusion, the court stated:
Unlike other types of invasion of privacy, intrusion does not involve. . . publication of the
information obtained. The tort is completed with the obtaining of the information by im-
properly intrusive means. . . . We approve the extension of the tort of invasion of privacy
to instances of intrusion, whether by physical trespass or not, into spheres from which an
ordinary man in a plaintiff's position could reasonably expect that the particular defendant
should be excluded. Just as the fourth amendment has expanded to protect citizens from
government intrusions where intrusion is not reasonably expected, so should tort law pro-
tect citizens from other citizens. The protection should not turn exclusively on the question
of whether the intrusion involves a technical trespass under the law of property. The com-
mon law, like the fourth amendment, should protect "people not places."
Id. at 704.
86. This tort applies to the giving of "publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another"
which is "highly offensive to a reasonable person and is not of legitimate concern to the public."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975) (publication of the name of a deceased rape victim which was publicly revealed in
connection with the prosecution of the crime).
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public.87 The tort of unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another is
the one most likely to be implicated by employee drug testing.88 Many re-
cent federal89 and state9° court decisions have adopted the definition of this
tort enunciated in section 652B of the Second Restatement of Torts: "One
who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability
to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person." ' Although litigants have not expressly
relied on section 652B, recent decisions indicate that employee testing may
implicate this tort.9 2
Despite its potential applicability, section 652B has not yet been held to
apply to employee testing. As a result, modern day tort law fails to ade-
quately protect the employee's right to privacy. This inadequacy is not be-
cause the level of privacy tort once secured is no longer sufficient, but rather
87. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (plaintiffs alleged that article pub-
lished in newspaper unreasonably placed their family in a false light before the public through its
many inaccuracies and untruths).
88. Although this tort has not been specifically applied to employee testing, comment c of the Restate-
ment is careful to point out that "[oither forms of [invasion] may still appear .... [N]othing in
this chapter is intended to exclude the possibility of future developments in the tort law of pri-
vacy." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A, comment c (1977). Indeed, it was this "elas-
ticity of our law" in the "application of existing priciples to a new state of facts" that made possible
the development of this area of tort law. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 213.
89. See McSurely v. McCellan, 753 F.2d 88 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.
2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984); Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, Inc., 711 F.2d 1524 (1 th Cir.
1983); Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304 (10th Cir. 1983); Harbulak v. Suffolk County, 654 F.2d
194 (2d Cir. 1981).
90. See Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 300 Or. 452, 712 P.2d 803 (1986);
Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 66 Md. App. 133, 502 A.2d 1101 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986);
Werner v. Kliewer, 238 Kan. 289, 710 P.2d 1250 (1985); Chicarella v. Passant, 343 Pa. Super 330,
494 A.2d 1109 (Pa. Super Ct. 1985); Forsberg v. Housing Authority of City of Miami Beach, 455
So.2d 373 (Fla. 1984); N.O.C., Inc. v. Schaefer, 197 N.J. Super. 249, 484 A.2d 729 (1984); K-Mart
Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Venturi v. Savitt, Inc., 191
Conn. 588, 468 A.2d 933 (1983); Sofka v. Thai, 662 S.W.2d 502 (Mo. 1983); Harkey v. Abate, 131
Mich. App. 177, 346 N.W.2d 74 (1983); Sustin v. Fee, 69 Ohio St. 2d 143, 431 N.E.2d 992 (1982);
Lamberto v. Bown, 326 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 1982); Mark v. Seattle Times, 96 Wash. 2d 473, 635
P.2d 1081 (1981); Knight v. Penobscot Bay Medical Center, 420 A.2d 915 (Me. 1980); People v.
Brown, 88 Cal. App. 3d 983, 151 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1979); Munley v. ISC Financial House, Inc., 584
P.2d 1336 (Okla. 1978).
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
92. In Satterfield v. Lockheed Missles and Space Co., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1359 (D.S.C. 1985), an elec-
tronic missile technician submitted to a urinalysis test for drug use while undergoing an annual
physical required as part of his employment. Id. at 1360. He tested positive for marijuana and was
terminated. Id. The employee sued Lockheed claiming an invasion of privacy. In his complaint,
however, he failed to specify the type of invasion on which his claim was based. Id. at 1369. While
the court did not rule in the employee's favor, this case is significant because the court "presumed"
that the plaintiff was alleging a "wrongful intrusion into his private activities." Id. at 1369-70.
Another indication of the applicability of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion to the type of
invasion resulting from employee testing is O'Brien v. Papa Gino's of America, Inc., 780 F.2d 1067
(1st Cir. 1986). In O'Brien, an employee was confronted by his employer with rumors that he had
been seen using drugs while off-duty. Although the employee denied the rumors, the employer
requested that he submit to a polygraph test because company policy prohibited drug use. Id. at
1070-71. The employee acquiesed and the test revealed that he had lied about his drug use. Id. at
1071. Following his termination, he sued his employer for an invasion of privacy.
The First Circuit upheld a special verdict which found the methods used by the employer to be
highly offensive to a reasonable person and an invasion of privacy. Id. at 1071-72. Although the
court did not expressly rely on § 652B, this case is significant because the court allowed the plain-
tiff to recover under a tort standard in an employee testing context. Furthermore, the type of
invasion resulting from polygraph testing is analagous to that of drug testing in the form of
urinalysis.
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because that level is no longer secured in the face of scientific and techno-
logical advances such as drug testing.93 Drug testing has raised the specter
of invasions of privacy to a new and frightening level. "Our capacity to deal
with the impact of this new technology depends in part, on the degree to
which we can assimilate the threat it poses to the settled ways our legal
institutions have developed for dealing with similiar threats in the past."94
Although committed to protecting the individual's privacy interests, tort
law has not yet responded to the new type of threat posed by drug testing.
As a result, it cannot be currently relied upon to protect employees from
this intrusive practice.
Constitutional Law and the Public Sector
Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention a right to pri-
vacy, courts have consistently implied such a right from the Bill of Rights
by either reading several of its provisions together95 or by interpreting the
fourth amendment96 as an individual safeguard of this right. The Supreme
Court has identified two different types of privacy interests protected by the
first approach-the individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters and his interest in making certain types of important decisions.97 In
the past, protection of these interests has been strictly limited to "matters
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and
childrearing."98 It is unlikely that courts will extend this protection to en-
compass the privacy interests of the employee subjected to drug testing. The
Fifth Circuit has held that the right to possess or use marijuana in one's
own home cannot be classified as a fundamental right protected by a consti-
tutional zone of privacy.99 If this approach does not recognize an individual
93. See Gavison, supra note 57, at 465; Bloustein, supra note 57, at 1006-07.
94. Bloustein, supra note 57, at 963.
95. The Supreme Court has found that the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments, taken
collectively, establish a zone or penumbra in which privacy is protected from governmental inva-
sion. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (state statute prohibiting the use, or coun-
seling of others in the use, of contraceptives held unconstitutional).
96. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issuse, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable search and seizures
is not by its language limited to criminal contexts and has been held to apply to warrantless admin-
istrative searches. The Supreme Court has declared: "It is surely anomalous to say that the individ-
ual and his private property are fully protected by the fourth amendment only when the individual
is suspected of criminal behavior." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967) (city
ordinance permitting warrantless searches of apartment buildings by city housing inspectors held
unconstitutional). The Court has defined this prohibition as protecting the individual's "interests in
human dignity and privacy. ... Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966). See Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
97. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 588-600 (1977).
98. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (plaintiff could not bring suit for constitutional invasion of
privacy against a police chief who sent fliers to local merchants showing the plaintiff's photograph
and falsely labeling him a shoplifter).
99. Louisiana Affiliate of the Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Guste, 380 F. Supp. 404,
409 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd, 51 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 867 (1975) (denied
injunctive relief against Federal Controlled Substances Act and Louisiana Controlled Dangerous
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as having a fundamental right to use drugs in his own home, it is not likely
to recognize the existence of such a right in the workplace. Consequently,
this approach is not apt to protect the individual's interest in avoiding dis-
closure of drug-related activities.
The courts have, however, viewed the fourth amendment as protecting
the individual's interests in human dignity and privacy in the context of
employee testing. The fourth amendment protects people from unreasona-
ble search and seizures by the government. Courts have held that employee
testing in the form of urinalysis" ° and blood analysis'' constitutes a search
within the meaning of the fourth amendment and have required public em-
ployers to comply with its prohibitions. Yet, fourth amendment protections
are not absolute. For example, members of the military do not receive the
same degree of constitutional protection as their civilian counterparts. They
are deemed to have a diminished expectation of privacy due to the condi-
tions peculiar to the military community and mission." 2 In all instances,
once the requisite expectation of privacy is found to exist, the interest of the
individual is balanced against the claim of the state and may be overridden
by a compelling interest.'0 3
The fourth amendment standard of reasonableness prevents public em-
ployers from subjecting civilian employees to drug testing on a purely sub-
jective basis. In a recent case challenging the constitutionality of such
testing, a federal district judge stated that even a generalized suspicion is
not sufficient:
No doubt most employers consider it undesirable for employees to use
drugs, and would like. . . to identify any who use drugs. . . [and] there is
no doubt that searches and seizures can yield a wealth of information useful
to the searcher. (That is why King George III's men so frequently searched
the colonists). That potential, however, does not make a governmental em-
ployer's search of an employee a constitutionally reasonable one. 104
Employee testing has, however, survived fourth amendment challenges
when the employer has shown a compelling state interest-such as public
Substances Act insofar as they make the private use and possession of marijuana by adults a crime
in Louisiana).
100. See Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, no. 83-1213 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 13, 1985) (available on
LEXIS and WESTLAW); Shoemaker v. Handel, No. 85-1770 (D. N.J. Sept. 9, 1985) (available on
LEXIS and WESTLAW) McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985); Allan v.
City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 488 (D. Georgia 1985); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214,
1217 (S.D. N.Y. 1984); Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir.), cert
denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
101. See McDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 1127; Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1218; Amalgamated, 538 F.2d at
1267; Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767.
102. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (delineating fourth amendment rights of military
personnel). For fourth amendment purposes, civilian police officers have also been held to have a
diminished expectation of privacy:
While as a matter of degree we do not necessarily extend to the uniformed civilian services
the same narrowly circumscribed expectation of privacy accorded to members of the mili-
tary, the fact remains the police force is a para-military organization dealing hourly with
the general public in delicate and often dangerous situations. So we recognize that, as is
expected and accepted in the military, police officers may in certain circumstances enjoy
less constitutional protection than the ordinary citizen.
Turner, No 83-1213, slip op.
103. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35.
104. McDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 1130.
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safety-as well as some form of reasonable basis for believing that the tests
would produce evidence of individual drug use. t0 5 Under these circum-
stances, despite the employee's reasonable expectation of privacy, the
search is justified as reasonable and therefore constitutional., 06
Recently, in Jones v. McKenzie, 1°7 an employee drug testing program
was held unconstitutional because the employer failed to establish a com-
pelling state interest or a reasonable basis of particularized suspicion. In
Jones, the Transportation Division of the District of Columbia school sys-
tem enacted a drug testing program to enforce a policy prohibiting school
personnel from "possessing, using or being under the influence of illicit
drugs."'' 8 Pursuant to this program, it required the plaintiff, a school bus
attendant, to submit to a urinalysis test even though it had no "particular-
ized suspicion that she had ever used or was under the influence of drugs
either on or off the premises." "9 The plaintiff tested positive, indicating the
presence of marijuana, and was terminated.1"'
The plaintiff sued in federal district court alleging an unconstitutional
invasion of privacy. The court distinguished the plaintiff's duties from
those of the school bus driver and mechanic who were responsible for the
operation and maintenance of the schoolbus."' As a "bus attendant," the
court found that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy which was not
diminished by public safety considerations.' 12 In addition, the court stated
that the Transportation Division could not administer a urinalysis test for
drug use without "first establishing probable cause, based on specific objec-
tive facts, that she was using or under the influence of illicit drugs."" 3 Be-
cause the Transportation Division did not fulfill these requirements, its
105. See Turner, No. 83-1213 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 13, 1985) (upholding a police department's drug testing
program, which required a reasonable, objective basis of suspected drug use prior to testing, due to
the state's interest in public safety); Amalgamated, 538 F.2d 1264 (upholding the testing of city bus
drivers, following involvement in serious accidents or when suspected of drug or alcohol use, due
to the state's interest in public safety); McDonell, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (despite a "weighty" state
interest, Department of Correction's drug testing program held unconstitutional because adminis-
tered pursuant to a "generalized suspicion"). But see Shoemaker v. Handel, No. 85-1770 (D. N.J.
Sept. 9, 1985) (available on LEXIS and WESTLAW) (drug testing of jockeys by state Racing
Commission upheld in absence of individual suspicion due to the state's interest in regulating horse
racing).
106. The Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches "are per se unreasonable under the fourth
amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971). Drug testing appears to have emerged as an
exception to the warrant requirement due to the fleeting nature of the evidence. See Allan, 601 F.
Supp. at 489; Amalgamated, 538 F.2d at 1267 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71). Some courts,
however, have failed to even address this issue. See Jones v. McKenzie, No. 85-1624 (D.D.C. Feb.
25, 1986) (available on LEXIS and WESTLAW); McDonell, 612 F. Supp. 1122.
107. No. 85-1624 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 1986) (available on LEXIS and WESTLAW).
108. Id.
109. As a "bus attendant" the plaintiff's duties were "to assist students as they got on and off the buses,
particularly handicapped students who required someone to lift them on and off a bus and to
observe them en route to and from school." Id.
110. Despite the warning of the manufacturer's label and a Food and Drug Administration report, the
employer failed to confirm the positive test result with an alternative method. As a result, the court
-ruled that the test result could not be relied on as evidence to support the contention that the
plaintiff had violated the employer's policy forbidding drug use. Id.
111. The court cited to Amalgamated which held that bus drivers could be subjected to drug testing due
to a compelling state interest in public safety. Id. See Amalgamated, 538 F.2d at 1267.
112. Jones, No. 85-1624.
113. Id.
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actions were held to have violated the plaintiff's fourth amendment right to
privacy.' 
1 4
The balancing approach required by the fourth amendment adequately
protects the privacy interests of the public sector employee subjected to
drug testing. In order to extend this protection to the private workplace it is
necessary to establish "state action.""' 5 Commentators have suggested ex-
tending this doctrine to include large private corporations." 16 They argue
that courts should not consider corporations as private phenomena due to
their "direct and decisive impact upon the social, economic, and political
life of the nation."' '" Consequently, they contend that the corporation, cre-
ated and regulated by the state, should be held to the same constitutional
standards applicable to the states."' It is unlikely that courts will be recep-
tive to this argument, at least in the near future. Recently the Supreme
Court indicated its reluctance to extend the doctrine of state action:
Careful adherence to the "state action" requirement preserves an area of
individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal judicial power. It also
avoids imposing on the state, its agencies or officials, responsibility for con-
duct for which they cannot fairly be blamed. A major consequence is to
require the court to respect the limits of their own power as directed against
state governments and private interest. Whether this is good or bad policy,
it is a fundamental fact of our political order." 9
As a result of the limitations placed upon the application of this doctrine,
employees in the private sector cannot rely on the prohibitions of the fourth
amendment to protect them from the intrusive practice of drug testing.
114. Id.
115. See supra note 79.
116. Hermann, supra note 2, at 141-42, 148-49; Friedmann, Corporate Power, Government by Private
Groups, and the Law, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 155 (1957); Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corpo-
rate Activities-Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA.
L. REV. 933 (1952).
117. Professor Friedmann contends that:
The corporate organizations of business and labor have long ceased to be private phenom-
ena. That they have a direct and decisive impact on the social, economic, and political life
of the nation is no longer a matter of argument. It is an undeniable fact of daily experience.
The challenge to the contemporary lawyer is to translate the social transformation of these
organizations from private associations to public organizations into legal terms.
Friedmann, supra note 116, at 176. This argument is buttressed by the fact that the size and influ-
ence of many corporations exceeds that of some states:
Most large employers, and certainly most large corporate employers, are nothing more than
mini-governments. Many have more income, more expenses, produce more goods, control
more land and assets, and have more people subject to their jurisdiction than all the 13
colonies did 200 years ago. More than a few are larger, have bigger budgets and control
more land and people than some individual states today. Some multinational corporations
exceed the budgets, gross national product, assets and populations of entire countries.
R. SMITH, WORKRIGHTs 38-39 (1983). See generally A. WESTIN & S. SALISBURY, INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS IN THE CORPORATION, A READER ON EMPLOYEE RIGHTS (1980).
118. See supra note 116.
119. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982). In Lugar, a creditor's prejudgment
attachment against a debtor's property, pursuant to a federal statute, was challenged as an uncon-
stitutional deprivation of due process. The Court held that the defendant's joint activity with the





A Need For Legislation
Drug testing poses a threat to the privacy rights of all employees.
Although the existence of the right to privacy is recognized by both society
and its laws, the scope of its protection is inadequate. Our present legal
system does not account for the fact that an employee's loss of personal
freedom and dignity is the same whether his right to privacy is invaded by
the government or by a private employer. Presently, workers in the private
sector, in contrast to those in the public sector, may be subjected to ran-
domly administered drug testing and denied employment as a result of its
outcome. These workers, who comprise eighty-five percent of the nation's
nonagricultural labor force, 120 are virtually without remedy due to the diffi-
culty of establishing an actionable tort, the absence of "state action," and a
lack of legislation in this area. Consequently, the privacy rights of the ma-
jority of the civilian working population are unprotected.
A legislative response is needed to fill the present gap in the legal sys-
tem. Congress should take the steps necessary to protect the private sector
employee by ensuring that his privacy interest receives the protection it
merits. For reasons of uniformity, federal legislation would be optimal. The
plight of polygraph proposals in Congress, however, demonstrates that such
an attempt is likely to be futile. 12 1 Therefore, as in the area of polygraph
testing, the states should take the initiative to regulate drug testing under
their "police powers." 122
Although both the employer's managerial prerogatives to control the
workplace and the employee's right to privacy are based on legitimate inter-
ests and concerns, neither of these rights is absolute. The limits placed upon
the employee's right to privacy are demonstrated in both tort 123 and consti-
tutional 14 cases dealing with employee testing. The limits placed upon the
employer's managerial prerogatives are evidenced by existing legislation,
such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964,125 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,126
child labor laws, 12 and laws establishing minimum wage.'22 This legisla-
120. Personick, A Second Look at Industry Output and Employment Trends Through 1995, MONTHLY
LAB. REV., Nov. 1985, at 26, 28. As noted earlier, some of these employees may gain protection
through collective bargaining. See supra note 77.
121. See supra note 62.
122. Under the Constitution, state governments (or their subsidiaries) are not creatures of limited, enu-
merated powers as is the federal government. States are recognized as having a general "police
power," i.e., an inherent power to protect the health, safety, or general welfare of their residents.
Any action taken pursuant to this power is valid under federal law unless it violates a specific
limitation imposed by the Constitution. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 121 (2nd ed. 1983).
123. See supra note 92.
124. See supra notes 105, 107.
125. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer "to refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex or national origin." Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
126. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1982). See supra note 70.
127. The Fair Labor Standards Act prevents employers from "employing any oppressive child labor in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce." Fair Labor Standard Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 212(c) (1982).
128. The Fair Labor Standards Act requires employers to pay a designated "minimum wage to all
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tion tempers the employer's authority under the employment at will doc-
trine as well as his economic justifications. Although the employment at
will doctrine once reigned supreme and the employer-employee relationship
was considered untouchable, 29 today government regulation is common-
place and is not deterred by economic considerations.
In each of the above examples of government regulation an injustice was
perceived and a policy determination was made to remedy it by expanding
the law to meet the needs of society. Such a determination should be made
in the case of employee drug testing for the following reasons: (1) it is an
intrusive procedure that violates a person's dignity; (2) its process of ob-
taining information invades a person's privacy; (3) its results are not always
accurate and their application in the employment context is questionable;
(4) an inaccurate or misinterpreted test result may cause an unjustified dis-
missal or denial of employment as well as jeopardize future employment
opportunities; and (5) current law does not adequately protect private sec-
tor employees from the adverse consequences of drug testing.
A Legislative Proposal: Recommended Provisions
Drug testing brings into conflict the legitimate interests and concerns of
both the employer and those he subjects to such testing. Consequently, a
total prohibition of such testing would seriously infringe upon the em-
ployer's rights, while allowing the area to remain unregulated would perpet-
uate the violation of present and prospective employees' rights. Legislation
that strikes a balance between these competing interests, while preserving
each to the greatest extent possible, is needed. The following model provi-
sions seek to clarify the debated boundary between permissible and forbid-
den conduct by providing a balancing approach that is adaptable to varying
factual scenarios. State legislatures should incorporate these suggestions as
the key provisions of any legislation in this area. 130
(1) The term "employee" includes any person working for salary or
wages within the state.
(2) The term "employer" includes the state and all political subdivisions
thereof and any individual, firm, corporation, partnership, or other organiza-
tion or group of persons however organized, located or doing business within
the state, that employ personnel for salary or wages, or any person acting as
an agent of such an organization.
Although the law recognizes the existence of the right to privacy in both
the public and private sectors, the present protection it affords is inade-
quate. This definition includes both public and private employers in order
employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or employed in an
enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. ... Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (a) (1982).
129. See supra note 54.
130. These provisions are modeled, with some exceptions, after a San Francisco City Ordinance that
regulates employee drug testing. This ordinance is the first, and remains the sole, piece of legisla-
tion enacted in this area. See San Francisco, Calif. Ordinance 527-85 (Dec. 2, 1985) (available at
San Francisco City Hall, San Francisco, Calif.).
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to rectify this discrepancy and to avoid the perpetuation of a double stan-
dard. The same privacy interest is implicated by drug testing in both the
public and private sectors and therefore should receive adequate protection
in each situation.
(3) The employer is prohibited from demanding, requiring, or request-
ing employees to submit to urinalysis or blood analysis as a condition of
employment.
This provision addresses the coercive nature of the employer-employee
relationship and the adverse effect it is likely to have on consent. It puts the
employer and the employee on an equal footing in an effort to curtail the
potential for abuse in the administration of such testing.
(4) The employer may require a specific employee to submit to urine or
blood testing if the following conditions are met.
(a) the employer has a reasonable suspicion, based on specific, objective
facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in light of experience,
that the employee's faculties are impaired on the job,;3 1 and
(b) the employee is in a position where such impairment affects his ability to
safely perform his job; and
(c) the employer provides the employee, at the employer's expense, the op-
portunity to have the sample tested and confirmed (by an alternate method)
by a state-licensed, independent laboratory testing facility and provides the
employee with a reasonable opportunity to rebut or explain the results; and
(d) the employer ensures, to the extent feasible, that the tests only measure,
and that its records only show or make use of information regarding chemi-
cal substances in the body which are likely to affect the employee's ability to
perform his job. And that prior to testing, the employer has set up a reason-
able system of record keeping which will prevent chain of custody problems
and ensure confidentiality of test results. All information acquired in the test-
ing process is privileged and cannot be transferred to other employers or
outside agencies.
When drug testing is used in an adversary situation, such as employee
testing, the stakes are high and every opportunity to mitigate the resulting
privacy invasion and ensure accuracy and fairness must be taken. In this
context, the employer has made a conscious decision to act in a manner
which is likely to result in violating the rights of another. Consequently, he
must assume the responsibility of acting in a manner that will accommodate
rather than jeopardize these rights. Accordingly, he is assigned the burden
of proof and must demonstrate that his actions are well-founded.
Drug use becomes a legitimate concern of the employer when it impairs
an employee's job performance. Current studies, however, show that testing
alone cannot accurately determine impairment. 132 Consequently, an em-
ployer must combine test results with information from other sources to
131. The San Francisco Ordinance merely requires the employer to have "reasonable grounds to believe
that an employee's faculties are impaired on the job." See supra note 129, at § 330A.5(a). The
model provision modifies this standard in accordance with that adopted in McDonell in an attempt
to make it more specific and easier to apply. See McDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 1130.
132. See supra notes 40-47.
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justify a decision to deny employment based on drug use. This provision
attempts to fill this gap by requiring the employer to objectively identify
relevant indications of drug use prior to testing. In addition, it requires the
employer to identify a legitimate safety concern prior to testing. Although
this requirement significantly limits the employer's use of drug testing, it
does not otherwise affect his response to suspected drug use in the work-
place. This provision does not limit the employer's right to terminate or
otherwise discipline the employee for violations of company policy.
(5) The employer is prohibited from requesting, requiring, or con-
ducting random or company-wide urinalysis or blood analysis.
The mere possibility of discovering drug use is far too attenuated to
justify the possible adverse consequences of drug testing. Such testing
would violate the underlying purpose of the previous provision and destroy
the balance of interests sought by this legislation.
(6) The employer is prohibited from demanding, requesting, or requir-
ing prospective employees to submit to urinalysis or blood analysis.
At this point the individual has not accepted employment, therefore the
balance must favor his privacy interests. The rationale underlying this pro-
vision is the same as that enunciated in the previous provision.
(7) Enforcement Provisions.
(a) Civil cause of action: Any person who violates or aids in the violation of
any provision of this legislation is held liable to the person aggrieved for spe-
cial and general damages, including attorney's fees and the cost of the action.
In any action brought under this legislation alleging that an employer has
committed a violation, the employer has the burden of proof to show that the
requirements outlined in 4(a), (b), (c), and (d) have been satisfied.
(b) Injunctive relief: This legislation empowers any court of competent ju-
risdiction to enjoin any person who commits or proposes to commit an act in
its violation. Standing to bring an action for injunctive relief is granted to any
aggrieved person, any state, district or city attorney, or any collective bargain-
ing agent who will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the pro-
tected class.
Conclusion
The use of drug testing in the workplace is increasing daily. The present
legal response to this intrusive practice fails to adequately protect the pri-
vacy rights of job applicants and employees in the private sector. In the
absence of legislation, neither employers nor the courts can be depended on
to overcome this deficiency. Experience demonstrates that self-regulation by
employers is unlikely, while the slow development of a uniform case law
approach prevents a timely remedy. Consequently, failure to enact the type
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of legislation proposed in this note will invite further violations of a deeply
cherished and otherwise protected right.
Charles E. Lindsey, Jr. *
* B.A., St. Michael's College, 1983; J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 1987.
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